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Language Processing Laboratory, Department of Psychology, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada
We examined the ability of preschool-aged children to identify conflicting, or ambivalent,
desire states (e.g., “I want to go to the birthday party because there will be cake, but I
also don’t want to go because I’m having fun playing at home”). Participants were 4- and
5-year-old children, and a group of undergraduate students (n = 20 in each age group).
They were presented with 14 scenarios involving both “single desire” and “dual desire”
states, including both approach (i.e., “want”) and avoidance (i.e., “not want”) desires. Our
primary interest was children’s ability to identify concurrent conflicting “dual desire” states,
and this ability was found in most of the 5-year-old age group tested and in about half
of the 4-year-old age group. As such, these results provide evidence that children can
identify ambivalence at earlier ages than previously reported. In addition, results showed
that the challenge in recognizing ambivalence is the presence of desires of opposite
valence directed at the same target.
Keywords: ambivalence, conflicting desires, approach/avoidance, ulysses conflict, desire reasoning
Introduction
Ambivalence is the state of both wanting and not wanting something, such as when you are tempted
by a late-afternoon snack but at the same time don’t want to spoil your appetite for dinner. This is
a common mental state, and one that is sometimes referred to as a Ulysses conflict, in reference to
Ulysses’ ambivalence over wanting to hear the songs of the Sirens but not wanting to meet the fate of
those who did (Elster, 1979).
The experience of concurrent conflicting desires is something adults can typically identify
and reason about, grasping the duality and conflicting nature of these situations. We know less,
however, about when children can identify these ambivalent desire scenarios. Previous research
has demonstrated that between 3 and 4 years of age, children begin to learn that a single scenario
can produce conflicting desires in different individuals (Flavell et al., 1992; Rakoczy et al., 2007).
Specifically, they can appreciate that while Person A might have desire “X,” Person B might have
desire “Y.” Research by Bennett and Galpert (1993) demonstrated that as early as age 5 children
understand that there can be an experience of conflicting desires within one individual, however,
this understanding is limited to successive desires (i.e., desire “X” followed by desire “Y”). In a follow
up experiment involving concurrent conflicting desires, such as a character being invited to two
birthday parties on 1 day, only 11-year old children asserted that the character could, at the same
time, both want and not want to go to the party. As such, the recognition that it is possible to have
concurrent conflicting desires within an individual seems to be particularly challenging.
More recent research on concurrent conflicting desire states examined identification in 4- to
7-year-old children and a group of adults (Choe et al., 2005). In Study 1, participants were shown a
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video depicting one of three scenarios: two individuals with con-
flicting desires, one individual with successive conflicting desires,
or one individual with concurrent conflicting desires (“Ulysses
condition”). In the concurrent conflicting desires condition, the
script conveyed the want desire, and the actor’s body language
and facial expressions (longing glances, hesitation) conveyed their
conflict. Study 1 involved a verbal open-ended response format,
and only the adult participants provided responses which referred
to a conflicting mental state. In Study 2, the same age groups were
tested but only the Ulysses condition was included. The scenarios
were depicted using still images from the Study 1 video materials
and narration described the character’s facial expressions and
hesitation (e.g., Jane saw the cookies on the table. She smiled at
first, but in a little while, she frowned…). The response format
was modified such that participants simply had to identify the
characters’ mental state (e.g., What was Jane’s mind like?) from
three options depicted in thought bubbles: I want to eat these
cookies, I don’t want to eat these cookies, or I both want and
not want to each these cookies at the same time. Using this
response format, both the adults and the 7-year-old children were
able to identify concurrent conflicting desire states (i.e., they
selected the third thought bubble option at an above-chance level).
The multiple-choice thought-bubble response format in Study 2
appeared to be easier for the child participants to understand than
the open-ended response format in Study 1, which is consistent
with previous research (Harter and Whitesell, 1989).
Although the adult participants in Choe et al.’s (2005) Study 2
performed above chance (65% accuracy), they were actually less
accurate than in Study 1 (85% accuracy). The procedure in both
studies provided only minimal cues about the mental state of
the character, such as whether she was smiling or frowning, and
the verbal script provided few details. In addition, the scenarios
included themes that were both familiar (wanting cookies) and
unfamiliar (wanting to smoke cigarettes) to children. Choe et al.
(2005) concluded that children’s ability to recognize concurrent
conflicting mental states is emerging at age 7. They noted that this
was somewhat surprising, given that theory of mind skills develop
earlier, but suggested the delay could be attributed to the fact that
there are usually few outward cues that a person is experiencing
conflicting mental states. In the absence of such cues, children
struggle “due to the lack of experience with internal conflicts of
their own.” (p. 392).
In a subsequent study, Rostad and Pexman (2014) directly
assessed the relationship between children’s theory of mind skills
and their ability to identify conflicting desires. In addition, Rostad
and Pexman (2014) investigated whether, if children were given
more insight about the speaker’s desires, concurrent conflicting
desire identification could be found in even younger age groups.
Child participants ranged in age from 4 to 7 years, and a group of
adults were included for comparison. There were four testing con-
ditions: “Approach” involved a single “want” desire, “Avoidance”
involved a single “not want” desire, “No Conflict” involved dual
desires which were not mutually exclusive (i.e., wanting “X” and
not wanting “Y”), and “Conflict” involved dual desires which were
mutually exclusive and created ambivalence (i.e., wanting “X” and
not wanting “X”). The testing procedure involved child-friendly
characters and desire items, and information about the character
was provided to give context to the desire state(s): This is David.
David wants to ride a bicycle right now because there is a big hill
near his house that he likes to ride down really fast. David also does
not want to ride a bicycle right now because the last time he rode a
bicycle he fell and hurt his knee. As in Study 2 of Choe et al. (2005),
a multiple-choice thought-bubble response format was employed.
The results of the Rostad and Pexman (2014) study showed,
first, that children’s identification of conflicting desires was related
to their theory of mind (second order false belief) and execu-
tive function (Dimensional Change Card Sort, DCCS, Zelazo,
2006) skills. Second, and consistent with the results of Choe
et al. (2005), Rostad and Pexman (2014) found that adults and
7-year-old children were able to correctly identify concurrent
conflicting desire states in the “Conflict” condition (100 and 88%
accuracy, respectively). However, the 6-year-olds in Rostad and
Pexman (2014) also performed at significantly above-chance lev-
els in the “Conflict” condition (83% accuracy), and the 5-year-olds
were approaching above-chance levels (52% accuracy, in a task
where chance was 33%). The 4-year-olds did not show accurate
identification for desire states in the “Conflict” condition, and
were significantly below chance in selecting the conflicting desire
response option (13% accuracy).
Current Experiment
It appears, therefore, that children as young as 6 years of age, and
even some 5-year-olds, may be able to identify ambivalence and
that the ability to identify ambivalence parallels development of
theory of mind and executive function skills (Rostad and Pexman,
2014). The current experiment was conducted to further examine
this issue, and had two main goals. The first goal was to examine
whether further modifications to the testing procedure would
allow children to find success in the “Conflict” condition at even
younger ages. In particular, we focused on modifications that
have been shown to reduce the executive functioning and other
demands in mental state reasoning tasks. Rubio-Fernández and
Geurts (2013) showed that 3-year-olds could pass a false belief
task when the procedure was modified to help children take and
track the perspective of the protagonist. In the current experiment,
we modified the procedure to help children take the speaker’s
perspective: we presented a puppet as speaker in each story, and
used a response procedure that involved the children placing
the appropriate desires (response objects) in the puppet’s mind
(thought bubble) themselves. False belief performance is also
supported by language (labeling) that highlights the protagonist’s
perspective (e.g., Low and Simpson, 2012). In the current exper-
iment, we provided children with additional description of the
basis for characters’ desires on the assumption that this could help
them represent the characters’ conflict. Finally, working memory
demands are one of the challenges children face in the false belief
task (e.g., Carlson et al., 2002) andwe sought to reduce those in the
current experiment by eliminating the use of a long and verbally
complex response prompt. That is, recall that in both the Choe
et al. (2005) and Rostad and Pexman (2014) studies children chose
a thought bubble only after each bubble had been re-described and
a response invited. Here the prompt was reduced from an average
of 40 words per trial to 14, and the particularly complex phrases
were eliminated.
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A second goal of the present study was to examine more
precisely the nature of children’s “dual desire” identification, to
determine what is difficult about ambivalence specifically. Pre-
vious research showed that children find avoidance (“not want”)
desires more difficult to identify than approach (“want”) desires
(e.g., Fritzley and Lee, 2003; Rostad and Pexman, 2014). Here
we investigated whether this negation is part of what makes
ambivalence challenging for children. That is, is the challenge of
ambivalence related to the presence of avoidance desires regardless
of themutual exclusivity of those desires (that is, even if the desires
are not directed to the same target?), or is mutual exclusivity
an important part of the challenge of ambivalence? The current
experiment was designed to adjudicate between these possibilities
by examining children’s identification of a variety of “dual desire”
scenarios.
Given that 6- and 7-year-old children in Rostad and Pexman
(2014) performed above chance, only 4- and 5-year-old chil-
dren were included in the current experiment. A group of adult
participants was also included for comparison.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty participants were included in each of the three age groups:
4-year-olds (M = 4.50 years, SD = 0.15, range = 4.16–4.77),
5-year-olds (M = 5.52 years, SD = 0.24, range = 5.13–5.94), and
adults (M = 21.83 years, SD = 1.77, range = 18.29–24.57). Child
participants were recruited through the University of Calgary
ChILD participant database. They were typically-developing, pri-
marily of Caucasian descent, and resided in families from mostly
middle- to upper-middle socioeconomic classes. There were equal
numbers of male and female participants in both of the child
age groups. The adult participants were undergraduate students.
There were 17 females and 3 males in the adult group, which
is representative of the local undergraduate Psychology popula-
tion. Adult participants received one credit for their participation
(which equates to 1%), and this credit could be applied toward a
Psychology course of their choice. Eight additional children par-
ticipated but were excluded for reasons described below, including
a response pattern during the desire appreciation task (n = 3),
failure to pass the “single desire” criterion (n = 2), failure to meet
the training criterion (n = 2), and not completing the testing
protocol (n = 1).
The University of Calgary Conjoint Faculties Research Ethics
Board approved this research project. Child participants gave
verbal assent and their parent or guardian gave written informed
consent for the child to participate. Adult participants gavewritten
informed consent.
Materials
Thematerials for the desire appreciation task included 14 different
test displays (see Figure 1 for an example). Each test display was
mounted on a metal sheet and contained the image of a puppet
with an empty thought bubble. Surrounding the empty thought
bubble were six different response options on magnets. Three of
the response options were “want” desires and three were “not
want” desires (indicated by an image crossed out with an “X”).
FIGURE 1 | Example of test display for the candy story theme, with
main character, thought bubble, and response image magnets.
Four of the six response images were related to the theme(s)
introduced during the script for that trial and the other two images
were distracters. An easel was used to present the test display. The
easel was positioned on the testing table in front of the participant
but out of arm’s reach. Testing materials also included 14 different
puppets, one for each of the experimental trials.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually, while seated at a table across
from the experimenter. The desire appreciation task began with
a training procedure to familiarize participants with thought
bubbles and the response options. Participants were given brief
instructions about what thought bubbles represent [i.e., “thought
bubbles show what (the character) is thinking”] and about what
the response options represent [i.e., “putting this picture in
the thought bubble would mean that (the character) wants ice
cream”]. They had the opportunity to practice placing response
options in the thought bubble for a series of training stories. Some
of the training stories involved single desires and some involved
dual desires, but none involved concurrent conflicting desires.
Participants were given corrective feedback about their response
selections during the training trials. Participants were not given
any corrective feedback about their response selections during the
testing trials.
At the beginning of each of the 14 experimental trials, the
experimenter introduced a hand puppet. The experimenter then
read a script containing information about the desire(s) of the
puppet. After reading the script, the experimenter moved the test
display to the table and said “Remember everything I told you
about (puppet). Now show me what (puppet) is thinking.” At
this point the participant selected response option magnets and
moved them into the thought bubble. Two trials were provided
in each condition, with the exception of the “Conflict” condition
which had four trials. Given that the “Conflict” condition was the
primary condition of interest, it was decided that two additional
trials would allow for more confidence in the results. Increasing
each of the other conditions to four trials would have significantly
lengthened the procedure.
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TABLE 1 | Example of desire appreciation conditions using the candy story theme.
“Approach” condition “Avoidance” condition “Approach/Approach” condition
This is David. David wants to eat candy right now
because his sister brought home a bag of candy from
school and it has David’s favorite candy in it. David’s
favorite candy are lollipops, and he really likes the
strawberry ones.
This is Karen. Karen does not want to eat candy right
now because she got a tummy ache the last time she
ate candy. Karen’s tummy ache lasted for 2 days,
and she still remembers how bad it felt.
This is Alex. Alex wants to eat candy right now
because his sister brought home a bag of candy from
school and it has Alex’s favorite candy in it. Alex’s
favorite candy are lollipops, and he really likes the
strawberry ones. Alex also wants to drink pop right
now because his dad just brought home orange pop
from the grocery store. Orange pop is Alex’s favorite
pop, so it’s a special treat.
“Avoidance/Avoidance” condition “No Conflict” condition “Conflict” condition
This is Brenda. Brenda does not want to eat candy
right now because she got a tummy ache the last
time she ate candy. Brenda’s tummy ache lasted for
2 days, and she still remembers how bad it felt.
Brenda also does not want to eat chips right now
because they only have dill pickle and that is the
flavor she hates the most. Brenda doesn’t like real
pickles either, but hates dill pickle flavored chips even
more.
This is Martin. Martin wants to eat candy right now
because his sister brought home a bag of candy from
school and it has Martin’s favorite candy in it. Martin’s
favorite candy are lollipops, and he really likes the
strawberry ones. Martin also does not want to eat
chips right now because they only have dill pickle
and that is the flavor he hates the most. Martin
doesn’t like real pickles either, but hates dill pickle
flavored chips even more.
This is Michelle. Michelle wants to eat candy right
now because her sister brought home a bag of
candy from school and it has Michelle’s favorite
candy in it. Michelle’s favorite candy are lollipops, and
she really likes the strawberry ones. Michelle also
does not want to eat candy right now because she
got a tummy ache the last time she ate candy.
Michelle’s tummy ache lasted for 2 days, and she still
remembers how bad it felt.
Design
The study involved a within-subjects design and six different
experimental conditions. As such, the information in each script
was based on one of the following six test conditions. In the
“Approach” condition, the puppet had a single “want” desire (e.g.,
wants to eat candy). In the “Avoidance” condition, the puppet had
a single “not want” desire (e.g., does not want to eat candy). In
the “Approach/Approach” condition, the puppet had two “want”
desires regarding two different stimuli (e.g., wants to eat candy
and also wants to drink pop). In the “Avoidance/Avoidance”
condition, the puppet had two “not want” desires regarding two
different stimuli (e.g., does not want to eat candy and also does
not want to eat chips). In the “No Conflict” condition, the puppet
had a “want” desire regarding one stimulus and a “not want” desire
regarding a second stimulus (e.g., wants to eat candy and also
does not want to eat chips). Finally, in the “Conflict” condition,
the puppet had mutually exclusive “want” and “not want” desires
regarding the same stimulus (e.g., wants to eat candy and also
does not want to eat candy). Table 1 contains a full example of
the testing scripts for one theme. Each trial included a different
puppet character and a different story theme.
Scoring
Responses on each trial of the desire appreciation task were scored
dichotomously (“0” for incorrect and “1” for correct). For an
item to be scored as correct in the “dual desire” conditions, the
participant had to select both of the correct response images
and no other images. All other answers were scored as incorrect.
Proportion correct scores were calculated for each participant in
each of the six conditions.
There were three exclusion criteria regarding performance on
the desire appreciation task. First, participants were excluded
if they did not meet the training criterion of selecting at least
4/8 response images correctly during the training trials. Given
that participants were provided with corrective feedback, it was
considered quite problematic if participants did not successfully
learn the task. Second, participants were excluded if they did not
meet the “single desire” criterion. This was defined as a score
of at least 1/4 on the “Approach” and “Avoidance” conditions
during testing. The “Approach” and “Avoidance” conditions were
designed to be very straightforward and easy to understand; not
answering those questions correctly was taken as a sign that the
task was not understood.
Finally, participants were excluded if they displayed a particular
response pattern during the desire appreciation trials. Specifically,
three of the child participants demonstrated a response strategy
of placing both the “want” and “not want” response images in
the thought bubble for all themes mentioned during the script. In
the “Approach/Approach,” “Avoidance/Avoidance,” and “No Con-
flict” conditions, this meant that four images were placed in the
thought bubble, which was scored as incorrect. The “Approach”
and “Avoidance” conditions were also scored as incorrect using
this strategy, because both the “want” and “not want” images for
the story theme were placed in the thought bubble. However, in
the “Conflict” condition, this strategy led to a correct response
(i.e., the “want” and the “not want” image for the one story theme
were placed in the thought bubble). This exclusion criterion was
established because participants who used this strategy had very
high proportion correct scores in arguably the most challenging
“Conflict” condition, and scores of zero in all other conditions.
There were no adult participants who needed to be excluded for
any of the three exclusion criteria.
Results
There were no significant effects of gender or testing order on
accuracy in any of the age groups (all ps > 0.05), so these vari-
ables were collapsed for all further analyses. Figure 2 displays the
results for all participants in each of the six desire appreciation
conditions. As can be seen in Figure 2, the adults demonstrated
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FIGURE 2 | Proportion correct scores for the desire appreciation task
as a function of condition and age group. App = “Approach” condition.
Av = “Avoidance” condition. App/App = “Approach/Approach” condition.
Av/Av = “Avoidance/Avoidance” condition. Bars represent standard errors.
very high accuracy in each of the six conditions (96% accuracy or
better). This suggests that adults could readily interpret the stories
as intended. Given that the performance of the child participants
was of greatest interest, only the children’s data were included for
the remainder of the analyses.
Chance Analyses
Performance by both of the child age groups in each of the six
testing conditions was compared to chance using one-sample
t-tests (two-tailed). Chance (0.10) was calculated based on one or
two items being selected at random from the four related theme
images (i.e., there were 10 possible responses with one or two
non-distracter items, one of whichwas the correct response). Both
child age groups performed at significantly above-chance levels in
all six testing conditions (all ps< 0.004).
Although the 4-year-olds were performing at an above-
chance level even in the most challenging “Conflict” condition,
examination of the frequency data in that condition revealed
that performance was quite bimodal, with half of the 4-year-olds
(n = 10) unable to accurately identify desires (i.e., proportion
correct scores of 0.00) and almost half (n = 8) demonstrating
accurate identification (i.e., proportion correct scores of 1.00). The
remaining participants (n = 2) were precisely in the middle (i.e.,
proportion correct scores of 0.50). For the 5-year-old age group,
the data was more skewed toward accurate performance. That
is, one participant had a proportion correct score of 0.00, one
had a proportion correct score of 0.50, and the remaining 18 had
proportion correct scores of either 0.75 or 1.00.
Condition Effects
The main effect of condition (collapsed across the child age
groups) was significant [Fr(5) = 38.51, p < 0.001], suggest-
ing that there were differences in children’s accuracy between
the desire appreciation conditions. Bonferroni-Holm-corrected
a levels were used for follow-up comparisons, and the p values
were converted for reporting purposes using the Aickin and
Gensler (1996) method. Given that there were six conditions in
the desire appreciation task, 15 follow-up tests would have been
required to examine every pair of conditions. Therefore, planned
comparisons were performed on the seven pairs of comparisons
of greatest interest.
First, children’s accuracy in the “Approach” condition was
compared to that in each of the other five thought bubble con-
ditions. Accuracy in the “Approach” condition (M = 1.00) was
significantly higher than in the “Avoidance” condition (M = 0.85,
T = 2.97, p = 0.008, r = 0.47), “Avoidance/Avoidance” condition
(M= 0.81, T = 2.88, p= 0.012, r= 0.46), “No Conflict” condition
(M= 0.81,T= 2.88, p= 0.012, r= 0.46), and “Conflict” condition
(M = 0.64, T = 4.10, p < 0.001, r = 0.65). These results are
consistent with the findings from Rostad and Pexman (2014),
and indicate that single “want” desires are relatively easy for
children to identify. There was no significant difference between
the “Approach” and “Approach/Approach” conditions (M = 0.88,
T = 2.24, p= 0.126, r= 0.35), suggesting it is not necessarilymore
difficult for children to identify dual desires than single desires.
Next, children’s accuracy in the “Avoidance” and “Avoid-
ance/Avoidance” conditions was compared, and no significant
difference was found (T = 0.61, p= 0.627, r = 0.10). This further
indicates that “dual desire” conditions are not inherently more
difficult than their “single desire” counterparts. Finally, children’s
accuracy in the “No Conflict” and “Conflict” conditions was
compared, and the “NoConflict” conditionwas found to be signif-
icantly easier than the “Conflict” condition (T = 2.71, p = 0.018,
r = 0.43). This suggests that it is the mutual exclusivity of the
“want” and “not want” desires in the “Conflict” condition which
presents a challenge for children, and not simply the presence of
opposite-valence desires.
Age Effects
Mann-Whitney U-tests were conducted to compare performance
by the 4- and 5-year-olds in each of the six thought bubble condi-
tions. In the “Approach,” “Avoidance,” and “Approach/Approach”
conditions, there were no significant effects of age group
(U= 200.00, p= 1.00;U= 181.00, p= 0.657, r= 0.11;U= 170.00,
p= 0.342, r= 0.22; respectively). However, there was a significant
age effect in each of the “Avoidance/Avoidance,” “No Conflict”
and “Conflict” conditions, with the 5-year-olds consistently out-
performing the 4-year-olds (U = 135.00, p = 0.021, r = 0.37;
U = 135.00, p= 0.021, r = 0.37; U = 124.00, p= 0.029, r = 0.35;
respectively).
Discussion
The purpose of the current experiment was to examine the identi-
fication of concurrent conflicting desires in preschool-aged chil-
dren. Concurrent conflicting desires were defined as the presence
of two desire states that were mutually exclusive (e.g., wanting
to ride a bicycle and not wanting to ride a bicycle at the same
time). In previous research Choe et al. (2005) found that it was
not until age 7 that children could accurately identify concurrent
conflicting desires. In a subsequent study, Rostad and Pexman
(2014) provided children with additional explanation about the
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speaker’s desires and found that children as young as six could rec-
ognize conflicting desires. However, additional limitations with
previous testing procedures may have prevented younger children
from demonstrating a higher level of accuracy.
The procedure used in the current experiment involved a num-
ber of modifications to previous testing procedures designed to
reduce the demands of the task. Multiple contextual sentences
were included to provide more motivation and explanation for
each desire state. We introduced puppets and active selection
of response options for the speaker’s “mind” to help children
track the speaker’s perspective. To reduce the working memory
demands of the testing procedure we also shortened the test
question.With thesemodifications, the 4- and 5-year-old children
who participated in the current experiment were able to demon-
strate significantly above-chance performance in each of the six
desire appreciation conditions including the “Conflict” condition,
which represented concurrent conflicting desires. Specifically, the
5-year-olds performedwith 84% accuracy in the “Conflict” condi-
tion, and the 4-year-olds performed with 45% accuracy. Our goal
was to identify the age at which children begin to identify concur-
rent conflicting desires; we did not compare these modifications
systematically across multiple experiments, so we are not able to
identify which particular modification(s) were responsible for the
earlier accuracy in the current study.
In addition, the relative difficulty of “dual desires” was eluci-
dated in the current experiment by the inclusion of four different
“dual desire” conditions. Results showed that the “Conflict” con-
dition was the most difficult for child participants and was signif-
icantly more challenging than the “No Conflict” condition, which
also included one “want” desire and one “not want” desire. These
results suggest that the challenge of the “Conflict” condition was
not simply that it involved the representation of two concurrent
desire states. If that were the case, all four of the “dual desire” con-
ditions would have been equally difficult to identify. It also cannot
be argued that the challenge of the “Conflict” condition is that
it requires representation of two concurrent opposite-direction
desire states. If that were the case, performance in the “Conflict”
conditionwould have been comparable to performance in the “No
Conflict” condition. Rather, it appears fair to conclude that the
“Conflict” condition is the most challenging because it involves
the presence of one “want” desire and one “not want” desire which
are mutually exclusive (representing an ambivalent desire state).
Thus, the challenge of ambivalence seems to be representation of
opposite desires toward the same object.
In the present study, we observed that there were individual
differences in the 4-year-old group, with about half demonstrating
accurate identification in the “Conflict” condition. These individ-
ual differences could involve the related constructs of theory of
mind and executive function skills (Rakoczy, 2010; Rostad and
Pexman, 2014). Indeed, in order to provide an accurate response
in the “Conflict” condition, we presume that children had to detect
the conflict in the puppet’s opposite desires about the same object,
and also had to recognize that conflict as a possible mental state.
This would likely involve cognitive flexibility, and it is striking that
4-year-olds showed emerging identification of conflicting desires
in the present study and the same age group shows intermediate
performance on the DCCS task (Zelazo, 2006). Of course, it is
also possible that, as Choe et al. (2005) speculated, children’s
performance is related to their exposure to different beliefs about
the relationship between mental states and behavior, and notions
about the extent to which desires arise from internal or external
forces. These are important issues for future research.
The results from the present experiment indicate that some
children are able to identify concurrent conflicting desire states
by 4 years of age. However, the conflicting desires we presented
(i.e., eating candy, riding bicycles) were directed toward familiar
concrete objects and events which probably do not evoke the same
sort of abstract reasoning and complex emotional response as,
for example, conflicting desires regarding living with one parent
versus the other. The current results suggest that basic identi-
fication of rather simplistic conflicting desires states is possible
even for 4-year-olds. Formore complicated scenarios, particularly
those involving mixed emotional states, other research indicates
that appreciation for concurrent and opposite-valence emotions is
not developing until approximately age 10 (Harter and Whitesell,
1989; see Bennett and Galpert, 1993, for further discussion about
differences between emotions and desires).
The present results contribute to previous findings suggest-
ing that there appears to be a developmental trend in children’s
identification of desire states. That is, identification begins in
early childhood with simple and single desire states (Flavell et al.,
1992), continues on to dual but non-conflicting and/or non-
concurrent desire states (Bennett and Galpert, 1993), and finally
involves the dual and concurrent conflicting desire states exam-
ined in the current experiment. The present results show that
even preschool-aged children can demonstrate this impressive
cognitive achievement.
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